The Sudanese Claims are following here in some well-defined accusations against the Sudanese Transitional Military Council (TMC), the Sudanese political parties, the Sudanese dictatorial regimes, the Sudanese sectarian parties and even the Sudanese intifada.
Well, this episode which is not numbered yet along with its Arabic version Sudanese Political Claims continues from the following episodes:
You read about the allegations against the military council that have emerged in Sudan from the military religious regime of the National Congress Party (NCP), which was led by the international criminal Omar al-Bashir who's wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes committed against humanity in Darfur, South Kordofan Sudan and other regions.
The indictment of senior officers and personnel of the regime and Omar al-Basher's indictment along with the arrest warrant issued to arrest Sudanese dictator are still to be considered seriously to bring this criminal and his mercenaries in the regime, including those in the military council to international justice to be treated for crimes against humanity.
I continue the Sudanese Claims to look deeper into other charges and claims against the Sudanese political parties and the Sudanese Intifada. Of course the Sudanese Protests have none. But, we shall see why some people accuse the Sudanese Revolution without having any clue and for what.
The Sudanese Claims continue against what's called the Transitional Military Council (TMC) in Sudan, as this council proves simply that it is the stupid council on earth ever. This is why many activists in the revolution think that it is like that and the stupidity is the trademark of the junta.
We do not make accusations or these descriptions randomly, because the (TMC) demonstrates that stupidity by its practices during the negotiations.
First, it is stupid because the members of this council know that the council is illegitimate, as they know there is no any military regime in the world that is legitimate. This is the first point of accusation and indictment. If they don't know the points I have mentioned here, then they are stupid once again.
They are stupid for the third time because, it is very easier for them to get into history, by responding positively to the wishes of the Sudanese people rising and by agreeing that the collapsed regime was the worst regime and apologizing form their part of sharing interests with that regime.
They never for example thought of a heroic appearance like that in front of the people gathering there to their well awareness and understanding and to speak to them, admit that they were wrong and they are willing to shift the power to the revolution completely.
The have the idea that the collapsed regime has deeper network of militias, security agents and conspiring affiliation with the leaders of some countries in the Arabian peninsula they could depend on to preserve the infrastructures of the collapsed regime.
So, they are stupid for the fourth time because they think that they could use the militias, security agents and conspiring affiliation with the leaders of some countries in the Arabian peninsula to hold fast in power and build upon the infrastructures the collapsed regime has left.
While seeing the wide spread of the Sudanese revolution and the million of people gathering and ready to sacrifice for their nation, all of that hasn't bought their attention to think wisely about the dangers they face and come to the right solution. So, they are demonstrating this unprecedented stupidity for the fifth time.
Through this Sudanese Indictment against the Sudanese Transitional Military Council (TMC) I can count numerous kinds of stupidity. But, this is enough.
We move now to Sudanese indictment, or just a sort of allegations and claims against the Sudanese uprising and those who are leading the negotiations.
I personally have many doubts of them from the way they led the negotiations. I am doubting their intelligence and their measures of evaluation.
In fact there are no Sudanese Claims for the revolution, but rather accusations to the leading teams of the negotiators with the Sudanese Transitional Military Council (STMC).
However, there's a critique to the Sudanese revolution and the activists who ran it in the social media and prepared it through the zones and zobas committees.
So, here we follow the accusations from where we left at the first point, which was the accusations we hold against the (TMC).
Second, the Sudanese Claims against the Sudanese revolution are merely because there seems an illusion in the Sudanese mindset, for those who still believe that the Sudanese revolution can achieve its objectives through peaceful protests.
While most of the activists and participants in the revolution have chosen this peaceful approach, which is still persisting, the enemies, including the Sudanese Transitional Military Council (TMC) and the Rapid Support Forces move fast to achieve complete plots against the revolution.
The leader of the Rapid Support Forces started some tours to the eastern Sudan and other places to get more forces to his own army and he flew to Saudi Arabia to agree with the Saudi leadership conspiring against Sudan, and to get advice from them about what to do.
So, just thinking this peaceful way from the part of the revolution in this very dangerous moment isn't that wise. We can not continue a peaceful revolution with the bad development of all these circumstances, while the Transitional Military Council seeks to disrupt the implementation of the demands of the revolution, and while the Vice-President of the Council is seeking to get troops to recruit in his forces parallel to the army.
This clearly indicates that he seeks to strike the Sudanese army later and replace his forces to be an alternative to the Sudanese army so he will be the most powerful commander to control the Sudan without any dispute after eliminating the Sudanese revolution.
As long as the Transitional Military Council (TMC) is illegitimate, and the military regime from which it was originated was illegitimate, it means that it does not deserve to have any negotiations with it by any opposition such as the Freedom and change group and the Alliance of Sudanese Professionals.
In this regard and before the appearance of the (TMC), I suggested that the masses should not be moved in any revolution against the regime before we agree on three crucial mechanisms.
I explained the need not to move the street in this Sudanese revolution, before we agree in the various groups of revolution on the basis of functional dynamics, and on the completion of three mechanisms, namely the Constitution of the Revolution, the government of the revolution and the Tigers forces of the revolution (ANNUMOR ALSUDANYAH).
Then after that we shall come to moving the street. If our groups in the Sudanese revolution absorbed these mechanisms and implemented them accurately, the revolution would have taken over the administration directly, and that means we wouldn't have to need any illegitimate military council to hold negotiations with it.
In the absence of leadership composed of leaders with long political experiences, it is clear that any negotiation with the TMC gives its leaders legitimacy that they lack completely. The Sudanese political accusations that the Council faces in this context are related to the manner in which this Council plays tricks against the revolution.
It exploits the immaturity of the revolutionary actors negotiating with it, and maneuvers to gain time and plans actions behind the scenes to strike the Sudanese revolution from within and from abroad.
It seeks recognition and support from Arab leaders in the region who are already plotters against Sudan, supported Omar al-Bashir before to destruct Sudan and sell its productive schemes to them and provide them by mercenaries.
It uses the mercenaries of the collapsed regime, whose leader is trying to find a position for himself in these new circumstances, which they did not expect to explode in such an amazing and spectacular way with all its heroic daily details in the Sudanese revolution.
However, despite these numerous accusations and the seriousness of these threats to the safety of Sudan, the comprehensive revolution has become the lung that the country breathes through in the current circumstances, despite the difficulty of the road.
With the continuation of the method of revolutionary escalation alone, with the advent of crucial critical mechanisms, this comprehensive popular revolution can prevail, and then there is no way for the traitors at home to escape.
Neither the mercenaries at home, nor those dealers abroad who exploit the calamities of the people and deal with thieves like them in the Sudanese totalitarian authorities will rest.
We can export the revolution to their lands to make them taste the pain of miseries they have done for others.
The series in sequence 1 includes Sudanese political articles in English, Sudanese Arabic political articles, Sudanese commentaries and Sudanese comments, the loyal readers of the HOA Political Scene Newsletter and I have written on the HOA Political Scene Blog.
The readers of the Horn of Africa's Journal and the loyal visitors of HOA Political Scene have already built many categories on the Arabic HOA Political Scene at Readers Comment, Readers Read Good, Readers Write Comments and Readers Write Good.
They also add pages to this network at: Write about Chad, Write about Djibouti, Write about DRC, Write about Eritrea, Write about Ethiopia, Write about HOA, Write about Kenya, Write about Somalia, Write about Sudan and Write about Uganda.
The series of articles are in many episodes in the sequence of Sudanese articles and commentaries. This sequence alone has more than 200 episodes.
The work continues on the Sudanese sequence of political articles to complete the edition of it in an alphabetical and numerical order, as you see from the alphabet of the second term and the numbers.
This episode is connected with all of the episodes from episode 1 to the end. The episodes are at:
Episode 1: Sudanese Abilities| Episode 2: Sudanese Absence| Episode 3: Sudanese Abuse| Episode 4: Sudanese Achievements| Episode 5: Sudanese Actions| Episode 6: Sudanese Activities| Episode 7: Sudanese Administration| Episode 8: Sudanese Advantages| Episode 9: Sudanese Adversity| Episode 10: Sudanese Advices| Episode 11: Sudanese Advocacy| Episode 12: Sudanese Affairs| Episode 13: Sudanese Affiliation|
There are some Arabic versions of some of these episodes at:
Sudanese Political Abilities| Sudanese Political Absence| Sudanese Political Abuse| Sudanese Political Achievements| Sudanese Political Actions| Sudanese Political Activities| Sudanese Political Administration| Sudanese Political Advantages| Sudanese Political Adversity| Sudanese Political Advices| Sudanese Political Advocacy| Sudanese Political Affairs| Sudanese Political Affiliation| Sudanese Political Affliction|
The organization of the Sudanese political articles goes further to cover the following episodes:
Episode 15: Sudanese Aggression| Episode 16: Sudanese Agitation| Episode 17: Sudanese Agreements| Episode 18: Sudanese Aid| Episode 19: Sudanese Aims| Episode 20: Sudanese Alarm| Episode 21: Sudanese Alerts| Episode 22: Sudanese Allegations| Episode 23: Sudanese Allies| Episode 24: Sudanese Alternatives| Episode 25: Sudanese Ambitions| Episode 26: Sudanese Amnesty| Episode 27: Sudanese Analyses| Episode 28: Sudanese Anecdotes| Episode 29: Sudanese Anger| Episode 30: Sudanese Angles|
As well as Sudan, the organizational work continues to build other sequences with episodes for the other states in the Horn of Africa, including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Somaliland, South Sudan, and Uganda. Chad, or Tchad and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are supplementary.
This is a Horn Africas Network.
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